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Abstract:
A decision maker (DM) has some funds invested through two investment firms.
She wishes to allocate additional funds according to the firms’ earnings. The DM,
on the one hand, tries to maximize the total expected earnings, while the firms,
on the other hand, try to maximize the overall expected funds they manage. In
this paper we prove that, for every market, the DM has an optimal bonus policy
such that the firms are motivated to act according to the interests of the DM.
On the other hand, we also prove that the only policy that is optimal in every
market, is independent of the actions and earnings of the firms.
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1 Introduction
Bonus plans have an important rule in motivating agents in competitive markets, and espe-
cially in financial markets. In theory, these plans are intended to guarantee that financial
managers are investing their best time and effort to produce the optimal possible earnings
for their investors.
Though the motivation for these bonuses is clear, their effects are relatively vague. When
the outcomes are stochastic and the plans are based on past performance, the agents1 can
take unnecessary risks, from the investors’ perspectives, to increase their own expected payoff.
Therefore, the formulation of incentives plans has to ensure that agents are acting according
to the best interests of the people they represent.
In the current paper we address this problem through a basic set-up. We assume that
a decision maker (DM) wishes to invest additional funds using several firms. To do so,
she chooses an allocation rule, a bonus plan, that is a function of the firms’ outcomes. For
example, a DM has $100 thousand invested through two firms and she wishes to allocate an
additional amount of $50 thousand as a function of the earnings they produce by the end
of the year. Another example - the DM is a manager in an investment firm that needs to
distribute additional funds to several departments based on their annual return.
The motivation of the firms to maximize the total expected funds they manage could pose
a problem, as it may not coincide with the DM’s wishes to maximize the expected return.
As it may occur in real-life, the firms can take advantage of the imperfect monitoring of their
actions to increase their own expected payoffs, at the expense of the DM.
The results of this paper capture this problem in two aspects. First, we prove that for
every market, i.e., for every set of possible actions of the firms, the DM can fix an optimal
bonus plan such that the firms, in equilibrium, act according to the preferences of the DM.
This result applies when the market is relatively stationary, in the sense that the set of
actions does not change drastically. The proof we present in constructive and holds for a
general number of firms and actions. A bonus plan that is linear in the sum of differences of
the earnings of the firms proves to be optimal.
On the other hand, we also prove that a universal, non-trivial, optimal bonus plan does
not exist. In other words, when the market changes frequently and the set of actions can
change considerably, one cannot devise a bonus plan which remains optimal, unless it is
independent of the outcomes of the firms.
As these results indicate, we focus on the existence of an optimal bonus plan, given that a
1We sometimes refer to the firms as agents, and to the decision maker as investor.
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bonus plan is needed, rather than discussing the necessity of the plan itself. We assume that
agents who are indifferent between the outcomes they produce, due to the lack of incentives,
will almost surely lead to a sub-optimal result. For example, firms without results-based
payoffs, either positive or negative, will have no reason to invest in R&D, expand to new
markets, gain private information or even improve their trading capabilities.
This perspective defers our research and previous papers. In most previous works (see
Subsection 1.1 for a detailed description), the main question is whether a DM can design an
incentives plan such that skilled agents are rewarded while unskilled agents are screened out.
We, however, show that even when all the agents are skilful, every results-based bonus plan
can lead to a sub-optimal outcome. Thus, individual investing capabilities or distinct private
information, will have no positive effect on the agents’ chosen portfolios.
Another aspect that differs our work and previous ones is the usage of a benchmark
portfolio. As we compare the actual outcome of every agent to the potential outcome,
given the agent’s abilities and information, we do not require an exogenous benchmark.
Nonetheless, we show that a bonus plan which is linear w.r.t. the sum of the differences in
revenue of the agents is optimal, meaning that a comparison between agents is essential.
The implications of our results are not limited to the motivating example of additional
funds divided between competing firms. Our model also applies to cases where an investor
wishes to reallocate her previously-invested funds, according to future performance. There-
fore, the allocation rule the investor uses, could imply actual bonuses, as well as penalties,
and any combination of the two.
1.1 Related literature
Numerous studies were conducted over the importance of performance-based payoffs and
reputation in non-deterministic markets. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the aspect we
examine was never discussed.
Many papers examined the well-known ”herding” phenomenon, where agents tend to
mimic other agents, although they can preform better with a certain probability, in order to
conserve their reputation. One can track back this concept to the words of Keynes (1936):
”Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed
unconventionally.” (Book 4, Chapter 12, page 158).
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) follows this argument and shows, under certain circum-
stances, that agents simply mimic the behaviour of others, ignoring substantive information
they posses. Specifically, when the capabilities of an agent are assessed by the market ac-
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cording to his performance, as well as his conventionality, the agents may mimic each other,
leading to a sub-optimal outcome.
Dasgupta and Prat (2006) continues this line of work. It studies the effect of career con-
cerns on the performance of fund managers. Given a specific model, Dasgupta and Prat show
that without career concerns, only fund managers with special abilities trade. However, they
also prove that career concerns may lead to an equilibrium where unskilled fund managers
have to trade in order to stand out, which may involve taking unnecessary risks. This work
is generalized to a dynamic model in Dasgupta and Prat (2008). However, the latter focuses
on the effect of career concerns on market prices and trading volume. In both cases the
investors are risk-neutral return maximizers.
Although the ”herding” phenomenon is not our main focus in this paper, it is consistent
with our results. We prove that a potentially suboptimal outcome exists, because of the need
of agents to level their performance with the ones of their competitors.
In general, the manipulability abilities of unskilled agents were proven to exist in more
than a few papers, such as Lehrer (2001); Sandroni et al. (2003); Sandroni (2003); Shmaya
(2008); and Olszewski and Sandroni (2008).
Foster and Young (2010) proves that it is almost impossible to generate a bonus plan
such that skilled agents are rewarded while unskilled ones are eliminated from the market.
This result is based on the assumption that the agents’ strategies and tactics are not observ-
able. Recently, He et al. (2015) showed that this result could be altered when a liquidation
boundary is set along with requiring the agents to deposit their own money to offset the
potential losses.
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) studies the principle-agent problem in a completely dif-
ferent set-up than ours, yet it reaches a similar conclusion that sometimes the only optimal
incentives plan is constant. It proves that agents would divert their effort to where it is easier
to measure their performance in order to increase their payoff and derives implications with
respect to job design. For example, teachers that receive bonuses according to the students’
test scores, might neglect other important aspects.
Assuming that some actions are known to the risk-neutral investor, Carroll (2015) ex-
amines contracts where the investor is evaluating the performance of the agent through a
worst-case criterion consistent with her own knowledge. Under these conditions, it shows
that linear contracts are optimal. Nevertheless, one should not confuse this linearity and
our proposed linear bonus plan. In Carroll (2015) the conclusion is that a fixed share of the
return is optimal, whereas we suggest a contract where the linearity is taken with comparison
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to other agents.
1.2 Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 2-firm bonus-plan problem
that illustrates the drawbacks of results-based incentives in competitive non-deterministic
markets. In section 3 we present the model along with the main assumptions. Section 4
includes the main results divided into two parts: In Subsection 4.1 we show how to formulate
an optimal bonus plan for any specific market; In Subsection 4.2 we prove that every bonus
plan can fail as the market evolves, unless it is independent of the outcomes. Concluding
remarks and additional comments are given in Section 5.
2 A motivating example - a 2-firm bonus-plan problem
A decision maker (DM) wishes to invest some funds through an investment firm. There are
two possible investments firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. The DM has already some funds invested
through both of the firms and she wishes to allocate the additional funds according to some
predetermined rule that depends on the firms’ yearly earnings.
The goal of the DM is to maximize the expected earnings of past and future investments.
However, as she is not aware of the possible bonds in the market, she chooses to allocate
the entire available amount to the company which presents the highest earnings by the end
of the following year. In case both firms present the same earnings, the funds are divided
equally between the two firms.
The firms can invest either in Bond X1, which gives 5% per year with probability (w.p.)
1, or in Bond X2, which gives 5.1% per year w.p. 0.6 and 0% per year w.p. 0.4%. The goal
of the firms is to maximize their expected earnings and to maximize the overall funds they
manage, according to the utility functions given below.
In this example we prove that, although investing in BondX2 is suboptimal in expectation
relative to an investment in Bond X1 (and also riskier), the unique equilibrium is when both
firms invest in Bond X2.
Formally, let A “ tX1,X2u be the set of actions of the firms. We consider the actions X1
and X2 to be random variables on the same probability space with the distributions,
X1 “ 1.05 per year w.p. 1, X2 “
$&
%1.051, per year w.p.
3
5
,
1.0, per year w.p. 2
5
.
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These distributions are common knowledge of the firms. Fix λ P p0, 1q and define U1 and U2
to be the utility functions of Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively such that
U1pXi,Xjq “ λXi ` p1´ λq
„
1tXiąXju `
1tXi“Xju
2

,
and
U2pXi,Xjq “ λXj ` p1´ λq
„
1tXjąXiu `
1tXj“Xiu
2

,
for every action Xi of Firm 1 and for every action Xj of Firm 2. That is, the utility functions
are a weighted average of the earnings and the additional funds distributed by the DM. The
following lemma shows that the optimal action of both firms is X2.
Lemma 1. The unique equilibrium is when both firms choose to invest only in Bond X2.
Lemma 1 exemplifies an interesting situation. The expected earnings per year of Bond
X2 is 3.006% while the expected earnings per year of Bond X1 is 5%. Therefore, all the
parties involved, firms and the DM, would benefit in case both firms choose to invest in X1.
Nevertheless, the unique equilibrium is pX2,X2q and this market fails to reach an optimal
outcome.
Proof. Let us compute the expected utility of Firm 1 for every profile of pure actions.
There are four profiles we need to consider and the expected utility of Firm 1 in each is:
ErU1pX1,X1qs “ 1.05λ ` 0.5p1 ´ λq “ 0.5` 0.55λ;
ErU1pX2,X1qs “ 1.05λ ` 0.6p1 ´ λq “ 0.6` 0.45λ;
ErU1pX1,X2qs “ 1.0306λ ` 0.4p1 ´ λq “ 0.4` 0.6306λ;
ErU1pX2,X2qs “ 1.0306λ ` 0.5p1 ´ λq “ 0.5` 0.5306λ.
A similar computation holds for Firm 2. Inserting these expected values to a 2-player game
the game presented in Table 1.
X1 X2
X1 0.5 ` 0.55λ, 0.5` 0.55λ 0.4` 0.6306λ , 0.6` 0.45λ
X2 0.6` 0.45λ, 0.4 ` 0.6306λ 0.5` 0.5306λ, 0.5` 0.5306λ
Table 1: The game played by Firm 1 and Firm 2 as a function of λ.
For every λ P p0, 1q and for every Firm i P t1, 2u, action X2 strongly dominates action
X1 and the result follows.
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This example illustrates the problem when there are two firms and two pure actions. The
model, presented in Section 3, relates to a more general case in terms of firms and actions.
3 The model
Fix n P N and define N “ t1, . . . , nu to be a set of indices. For every i P N , let Xi be a
random variable with a countable support Si and finite expectation defined on the probability
space Ω. We refer to Xi as a pure action. Denote the set of pure actions X1, . . . ,Xn by
A “ tX1, . . . ,Xnu and denote the union of the supports of the random variables in A by
SA “
Ť
iPN Si.
A mixed action (or strategy) is a convex combination of random variables in A such that
q “
řn
i“1 qiXi and pq1, . . . , qnq P ∆pAq.
2 Note that a mixed action q is a random variable
and qpωq “
řn
i“1 qiXipωq for every ω P Ω.
Fix a natural k ě 2. A bonus plan (BP) of dimension k is a function f : Rk Ñ Rk such
that for every r P Rk,
kÿ
i“1
fiprq “ 1 (1)
and fprq P r0, 1sk . A k-player bonus-plan problem consists of a DM and k players (or firms).
The DM, who is not familiar with the pure actions in A, publicly commits to a bonus plan3
f , which defines a k-player game Gf as follows. Every Player i chooses a strategy, denoted
by σfi , based on the set of pure actions A. Denote σ
f “ pσf
1
, . . . , σ
f
k q. An ω P Ω is randomly
chosen and each Player i receives fi
`
σf pωq
˘
, while the DM receives
řk
i“1 σ
f
i pωq.
Definition 1. A profile of strategies σf is a Nash equilibrium in Gf if
E
”
fi
´
σ
f
i , σ
f
´i
¯ı
ě E
”
fi
´
q, σ
f
´i
¯ı
,
for every Player i and for every strategy q.
A convenient way to consider a k-player bonus-plan problem is by assuming that the
players are playing a game induced by the DM, which implies that the DM is essentially a
game designer or a mechanism designer. The players in Gf wish to maximize their expected
payoffs in equilibrium, that depend on the bonus plan f , and the DM wants to maximize
her expected payoff which is a function of the equilibrium strategies of the players in Gf .
2We use ∆pBq to denote the set of probability measures on the set B.
3We will not henceforth relate to the dimension of the function f when it is clear from the context.
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Formally, Player i wishes to maximize E
“
fi
`
σf
˘‰
where σf is a Nash equilibrium in Gf ,
while the DM wishes the maximize E
”řk
i“1 σ
f
i
ı
.
The bouns-plan problem has some similarities to the principle-agent problem. The DM
represents the principle who is interested in motivating her agents (e.g., investments firms)
to produce optimal expected earnings. However, the example given in Section 2 shows that
the appropriate method is not always the simple one. Sometimes a simple or an intuitive
bonus plan could generate a sub-optimal result for all sides. A general result motivated by
this example is given in the following section.
Definition 2. A bonus plan f is optimal, if the induced k-player game Gf has an equilibrium
σf such that
E
«
kÿ
i“1
σ
f
i
ff
“ kmax
iPN
ErXis. (2)
That is, f is optimal if there exist an equilibrium σf in Gf where the mixed actions of
all the players are weighted averages of pure actions with maximal expected value.
Remark 1. In order to simplify the computations and notations, we assume that
ErX1s ą ErXis, (3)
for every 2 ď i ď n. This implies that a bonus plan f is optimal if and only if pX1, . . . ,X1q
is an equilibrium in Gf .
Remark 2. For every bonus plan f and for every vector of pure actions X, it follows that
E
«
kÿ
i“1
fpXq
ff
“ 1.
Therefore, the game Gf is a fixed-sum game in the sense that the sum of the expected payoffs
of all the players is 1. For every bonus plan f and for every game Gf we can define an
auxiliary bonus plan f˚ such that f˚prq “ fprq ´
`
1
k
, . . . , 1
k
˘
for every r P Rk. The induced
game Gf˚ is a symmetric zero-sum k-player game.
4 Main results
In this section we prove the two main results of the paper. The first result shows that for
every finite set of random variables A, there exists an optimal bonus plan f . The second
result states that for every non-trivial (i.e., non-constant) bonus plan f , there exists a set A
such that f is not optimal.
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The combination of these results is significant when considering contracts planning. On
the one hand, in any non-deterministic market the DM can design a contract that ensures her
interests are kept by the agents. On the other hand, if the market is dynamic, meaning that
the market is constantly changing in terms of possible actions, then any bonus plan which is
not trivial can eventually lead to a suboptimal result. In other words, the only bonus plan
that assures that the players are acting according to the DM’s preferences, is a bonus plan
which is, paradoxically, independent of the players’ actions.
4.1 Fixed set of actions
The first theorem we prove is constructive. For every set of actions A, we specify an optimal
bonus plan f . The optimal bonus plan f , that we propose, is linear in the differences of the
earning of the players.
We start with the simple case of a bounded set SA. Fix a set of pure actions A. Let
IA be the minimal, finite, and closed interval containing all the values of SA and let MA
be the absolute value of the maximal element in IA (w.r.t the absolute value). That is, for
every ω P Ω and every action Xi, it follows that Xipωq P IA and |Xipωq| ď MA. Define the
MA-Linear Bonus Plan f by
fiprq “
$&
%
1
k
`
řk
j“1pri´rjq
2kpk´1qMA
, if r P IkA,
1
k
, if r R IkA.
One can verify that f is well-defined, since for every r P Rk, the equality
ř
i fiprq “ 1 holds
and fprq P r0, 1sk .
Theorem 1. For every set of pure actions A with finite support SA, the MA-Linear Bonus
Plan is optimal.
Proof. We have to prove that pX1, . . . ,X1q is an equilibrium in Gf , or equivalently,
that for every Player i and for every strategy q “
řn
i“1 qiXi of Player i (when q ‰ X1),
the inequality E rfi pX1, . . . ,X1qs ă E rfi pq,X1, . . . ,X1qs holds. Without loss of generality,
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assume that i “ 1, therefore
E rf1 pq,X1, . . . ,X1qs “ E
«
f1
˜
nÿ
i“1
qiXi,X1, . . . ,X1
¸ff
“ E
„
pk ´ 1q
řn
i“1 qiXi ´ pk ´ 1qX1
2kpk ´ 1qMA
`
1
k

“
1
2kMA
E
«
nÿ
i“1
qiXi ´X1
ff
`
1
k
ă
1
k
“ E rfi pX1, . . . ,X1qs ,
when the second and last equalities follow from the definition of f and the inequality follows
from the fact that q ‰ X1 and Erqs “ E r
řn
i“1 qiXis ă ErX1s.
The fact that pX1, . . . ,X1q is an equilibrium is not surprising. It follows directly from
the linearity of fiprq in ri. This linearity implies that X1 is a dominant strategy for every
player and therefore, the equilibrium is unique.
The following theorem presents a Bounded and Linear Bonus Plan f for the general case
(i.e., for the case that SA is not bounded) and proves that it is optimal.
Theorem 2. For every set of pure actions A, there exists an optimal bonus plan.
Proof. We extend Theorem 1 for an unbounded set SA by constructing a new optimal
bonus plan. Let rˆq,i “ pq, pX1qj‰iq be a vector of actions where player i chooses the mixed
action q and every other player plays X1. Note that for every q ‰ X1, the expected value
E rq ´X1s “ ´cq ă 0 for some cq ą 0. Since the expected value is negative and finite, there
exists a real number Mpqq ą 0 such that for every m ěMpqq
E
“
pq ´X1q1t|q´X1|ďmu
‰
ă ´
cq
2
, (4)
and ÿ
|l|ąm
|l|Prpq ´X1 “ lq ă
cq
2
. (5)
Ineq. (4) and (5) are strict, therefore there exists an open set Bpqq containing q such
that both inequalities hold for every q1 P Bpqq where q1 ‰ X1. The set of mixed actions q is
compact as it can be represented by a pn´1q-simplex, hence the set of open sets tBpqqu is an
open cover. It is known that there exists a finite subcover BA. Fix c “ minqPBA cq ą 0 and
let M ě maxqPBA Mpqq be a positive number such that for every m ěM and every q ‰ X1,
E
“
pq ´X1q1t|q´X1|ďmu
‰
ă ´
c
2
, (6)
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and ÿ
|l|ąm
|l|Prpq ´X1 “ lq ă
c
2
. (7)
Note that (7) hold for q “ X1 with weak inequality.
Define the Bounded-Linear Bonus Plan f by
fiprq “
$&
%
1
k
`
řk
j“1pri´rjq
2kpk´1qM , if 0 ď
1
k
`
řk
j“1pri´rjq
2kpk´1qM ď
2
k
,
1
k
, if otherwise.
One can verify that f is a well-defined bonus plan.
We prove that pX1, . . . ,X1q is an equilibrium in the game induced by the Bounded-Linear
Bonus Plan by showing w.l.o.g. that
Erf1pq,X1, . . . ,X1qs ă
1
k
“ Erf1pX1, . . . ,X1qs,
for every q ‰ X1. Note that
0 ď
1
k
`
ř
j‰ipq ´X1q
2kpk ´ 1qM
ď
2
k
ô ´2M ď q ´X1 ď 2M
ô |q ´X1| ď 2M.
Thus,
Erf1pq,X1, . . . ,X1qs “ E
„ˆ
1
k
`
ř
j‰ipq ´X1q
2kpk ´ 1qM
˙
1t|q´X1|ď2Mu

`
1
k
Prp|q ´X1| ą 2Mq
ď
1
k
`
1
2Mk
E
“
pq ´X1q1t|q´X1|ď2Mu
‰
`
1
k
ÿ
|l|ą2M
|l|
2M
Prpq ´X1 “ lq.
It follows from (6) and (7) that
Erf1pq,X1, . . . ,X1qs ă
1
k
´
c
4Mk
`
1
2Mk
ÿ
|l|ą2M
|l|Prpq ´X1 “ lq
ă
1
k
´
c
4Mk
`
c
4Mk
“
1
k
,
as previously stated.
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4.2 A universal bonus plan
A universal bonus plan f is a non-constant bonus plan such that for every finite set of actions,
f is optimal. Specifically, A universal bonus plan f is a non-constant bonus plan such that
for every set of actions X1, . . . ,Xn, where ErX1s ą ErXjs for every 2 ď j ď n, the profile of
actions pX1, . . . ,X1q is an equilibrium in Gf . The following theorem proves such a plan does
not exist.
Theorem 3. If there are two players, a universal bonus plan does not exist.
Proof. Let x ă y ă z. We first prove that f1py, yq ě f1px, yq. Assume to the contrary
that f1py, yq ă f1px, yq. Let A “ tX1,X2u be a set of two actions X1 and X2 with a joint
probability distribution,
X1zX2 x y
x 0 0
y 1 0
Note that ErX1s ą ErX2s. However,
Erf1pX2,X1qs “ f1px, yq ą f1py, yq “ Erf1pX1,X1qs,
implying that pX1,X1q is not an equilibrium in Gf , since Player 1 can benefit from deviating
to X2. Thus,
f1py, yq ě f1px, yq. (8)
For similar reasons,
f2py, yq ě f2py, xq. (9)
Next we prove that f1px, xq ě f1py, xq. Let p be a number in p0, 1q and let A “ tX1,X2u
be a set of two actions X1 and X2 with a joint probability distribution,
X1zX2 x y
x 0 p
z 1´ p 0
A direct computation shows that
Erf1pX1,X1qs ´ Erf1pX2,X1qs “ ppf1px, xq ´ f1py, xqq
` p1´ pq pf1pz, zq ´ f1px, zqq.
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Recall that f1pz, zq ´ f1px, zq is bounded. If f1px, xq ă f1py, xq, then there is p smaller than,
but sufficiently close to 1, such that for every z, Erf1pX1,X1qs´Erf1pX2,X1qs ă 0. In other
words,
Erf1pX1,X1qs ă Erf1pX2,X1qs. (10)
Now one can choose z to be sufficiently large, so that ErX1s ą ErX2s. Inequality (10) implies
that pX1,X1q is not an equilibrium in Gf , since Player 1 can benefit from deviating to X2.
Hence,
f1px, xq ě f1py, xq. (11)
Similar reason imply that
f2px, xq ě f2px, yq. (12)
We now sum up inequalities (8), (9), (11) and (12) to obtain, f1py, yq`f2py, yq`f1px, xq`
f2px, xq ě f1px, yq ` f2py, xq ` f1py, xq ` f2px, yq. Due to Eq. (1) we obtain equality. Thus,
(8), (9), (11) and (12) are actually equalities. Therefore,
f1px, xq “ f1px, yq “ f1py, xq “ f1py, yq,
and the proof is complete.
A generalization of Theorem 3 to any number of players k ě 3 is not trivial. In fact, the
requirement that f not be constant is not sufficient. For example, take any non-constant
bonus plan f : Rk Ñ Rk such that fiprq “
1
k
for every r P Rk with at least two identical
coordinates. In this case, for every action Xj, the profile of strategies pXj , . . . ,Xjq is an
equilibrium, as any deviation of a single player has no influence on the payoffs. On the other
hand, requiring that all equilibria satisfy Eq. (2) does not hold when f is constant, as all
profiles are equilibria. Therefore, we add a new requirement when the number of players is
three or more.
Definition 3. A strongly universal bonus plan f , is a bonus plan where every profile of
actions σf in Gf that sustains Eq. (2) is an equilibrium.
Theorem 4. If f is a strongly universal bonus plan, then every profile of actions is an
equilibrium.
Proof. Let f be a strongly universal bonus plan. Clearly, Theorem 3 implies that the
result holds for the case of k “ 2. Fix k ě 3. We prove the theorem by showing that for
every player i and for every vector of outcomes r P Rk, the ith coordinate fiprq of the bonus
plan is non-decreasing and non-increasing in ri.
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Assume to the contrary that there exists a player i, a vector of outcomes r P Rk, and
wi P R such that fipwi, r´iq ą fipri, r´iq where wi ă ri. Define the random variable X such
that PrpX “ xq ą 0 iff x “ rj when 1 ď j ď k. Assume that PrpX “ riq ą PrpX “ rjq for
every j ‰ i. In addition, define a set of i.i.d. random variables Xj „ X where 1 ď j ď k.
Define the vector-valued random variable pW,X´iq by
PrppW,X´iq “ xq “ PrppXi,X´iq “ xq @x ‰ r,
and
PrppW,X´iq “ pwi, r´iqq “ PrppXi,X´iq “ rq.
Clearly, pW,X´iq and W are well-defined. A direct computation shows that ErW s ă ErXs.
However, the vector pXi,X´iq is not an equilibrium as player i can deviate toW and increase
his payoff since fipwi, r´iq ą fipri, r´iq. Hence fip¨, r´iq is non-decreasing for every i and
every r´i.
Now assume to the contrary that fipri, r´iq is strictly increasing in ri. That is, there
exists a player i, a vector of outcomes r P Rk, and yi P R such that fipyi, r´iq ą fipri, r´iq
where yi ą ri.
Let z¯, z P R be two real number such that z¯ ą rj ą z for every 1 ď j ď k and let p be
a number in p0, 1q. Define the random variable Y such that, with probability p, it follows
that PrpY “ yq ą 0 iff y “ rj when 1 ď j ď k (assume that PrpY “ riq ą PrpY “ rjq for
every j ‰ i), and with probability 1´ p, the random variable Y equals z¯. In addition, define
a set of i.i.d. random variables Yj „ Y where 1 ď j ď k. Define the vector-valued random
variable pZ, Y´iq by
PrppZ, Y´iq “ yq “ PrppYi, Y´iq “ yq @y ‰ r, yj ‰ z¯ @j,
PrppZ, Y´iq “ pyi, r´iqq “ PrppYi, Y´iq “ rq,
and if there exists a coordinate j in y P Rk such that yj “ z¯, then
PrppZ, Y´iq “ pz, y´iqq “ PrppYi, Y´iq “ yq.
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Clearly, pZ, Y´iq and Z are well-defined. Note that
ErfipZ, Y´iqs “ E
”
fipYi, Y´iq1tY´i‰r,Yj‰z¯ @ju
ı
` fipyi, r´iqPrppYi, Y´iq “ rq
`
ÿ
yPRk:
Dj,yj“z¯
fipz, y´iqPrppYi, Y´iq “ yq
ą E
”
fipYi, Y´iq1tYj‰z¯ @ju
ı
`
ÿ
yPRk :
Dj,yj“z¯
fipz, y´iqPrppYi, Y´iq “ yq (13)
“ E rfipYi, Y´iqs `
ÿ
yPRk :
Dj,yj“z¯
pfipz, y´iq ´ fipyqqPrppYi, Y´iq “ yq, (14)
when Ineq. (13) follows from the assumption that fipyi, r´iq ą fipri, r´iq. The sum in Eq.
(14) is bounded, therefore we can choose p sufficiently close to 1 (but still smaller than 1), such
that for every z¯, the inequality ErfipZ, Y´iqs ą E rfipYi, Y´iqs holds. Taking a sufficiently
large z¯ and a sufficiently low z, guarantees that ErY s ą ErZs.
In conclusion, the vector pYi, Y´iq is not an equilibrium as player i can deviate to Z and
increase his payoff. Contradiction. Hence fip¨, r´iq is non-increasing for every i and every
r´i. The combination of the two results, proves that fi is independent of the i
th coordinate.
This implies that the expected payoff of every player i is independent of his actions and every
profile of actions is an equilibrium.
5 Conclusions and addtional comments
The results presented in this paper have two completing aspects: an applicative one and
a theoretical one. On the one hand, we give a specific description of a bonus plan that
guarantees that agents are motivated to act according to the DM’s wishes. On the other
hand, we show that an optimal bonus plan simply does not exist, unless it is useless as a
bonus plan (constant, meaning fixed payoffs).
This work is based on the assumption that the DM tries to maximize her expected
payoff. Although, this assumption is common in the literature, one can still follow the line
of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and assume that the DM tries to optimize a few elements
simultaneously. For example, maximizing the expected revenue while minimizing the risk. In
general, one can assume that the DM has a certain preference relation over the set of actions
and try to find a bonus plan which implements this preference in equilibria. These problems
are left for future research.
Another element left for future work is the generalization given in Theorem 4. This
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generalization could be done in various ways. E.g., we can assume that fip¨, r´iq always has
some dependency on the action of player i for every r´i, and then explore whether an optimal
bonus plan is possible under such conditions.
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